Mrs. Herman Foster And John Ewing, Natural Parents of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, Aka Jeffrey Ewing Foster, Deceased, A Minor, And David Mac Kelly v. Salt Lake County, A Body Corporate And Politic of The State of Utah : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Mrs. Herman Foster And John Ewing, Natural
Parents of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, Aka Jeffrey Ewing
Foster, Deceased, A Minor, And David Mac Kelly v.
Salt Lake County, A Body Corporate And Politic of
The State of Utah : Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Ted Cannon, Merlin Lybbert; Attorneys for AppellantCarmen
E. Kipp; Attorney for Respondents
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Foster v. Salt Lake County, No. 16608 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1885
L 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. HERMAN FOSTER and 
JOHN EWING, natural parents 
of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, 
aka Jeffrey Ewing Foster, 
Deceased, a minor, and 
DAVID MAC KELLY, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 16608 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY TO 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN 
Carmen E. Kipp 
600 Conunercial Club Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
TED CANNON 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Donald Sawaya, Deputy County 
Attorney 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
Scott Daniels 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
I~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. HERMAN FOSTER and 
JOHN EWING, natural parents 
of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, 
aka Jeffrey Ewing Foster, 
Deceased, a minor, and 
DAVID MAC KELLY, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 16608 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT. OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY TO 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN 
Carmen E. Kipp 
600 Commercial Club Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
TED CANNON 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Donald Sawaya, Deputy County 
Attorney 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
Scott Daniels 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 





IF "EQUIVALENT" MEANS "IDENTICAL" 
THEN SALT LAKE COUNTY IS LIABLE 
FOR NO MORE THAN $15,000 •.... 
IF "EQUIVALENT" MEANS "OF SUBSTAN-
TIALLY EQUAL VALUE" THEN SALT LAKE 
COUNTY'S LIABILITY IS LIMITED TO 
PAYMENT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS ONLY • 
RESPONDENTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO RE-
COVER ON AN IMAGINARY INSURANCE 





CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • • . . • . . 11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §31-19-18 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §31-41-1, et seq. (1953 as 
Utah Code Ann. §41-12-l(k) (Supp. 1979) 
Utah Code Ann. §41-12-21 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq., (1953 as 
Utah Code Ann. §63-41-1, et seq., (1953 as 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 









Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. HERMAN FOSTER and 
JOHN EWING, natural parents 
of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, aka 
Jeffrey Ewing Foster, 
Deceased, a minor, and 
DAVID MAC KELLY, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
- - -.- - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
There are significant issues raised by this appeal. 
They include: (1) collusion; (2) whether a judgment which 
could not be enforced against the insured can be entered 
~ainst an insurer; (3) the effect of representations made 
in securing a stipulation, etc. The critical issue to be 
decided, however, is the basic question raised by plaintiff 
underlying theory: Whether a self-insurer under the Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Automobile No-Fault Act is an implied liability insurer 
of the permissible users of its vehicles, and if so, what 
is the extent of coverage. 
Although Respondents' Brief deals only briefly with 
this issue (POINT I), several new arquments are raised. 
This brief deals with those new arguments. 
Prior to 1973, the State of Utah and its political sub-
divisions were not required to carry public liability insur-
ance for their vehicles. In 1973, however, the Legislature 
adopted the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, Utah Code 
Annotated §31-41-1, et seq., (1953 as amended), which provides 
that the State and its political subdivisions must maintain 
security in effect as provided in §31-41-5. 
Section 31-41-5 allows two alternative methods for pro-
viding the required security. Subsection (a) allows the pur-
chase of an insurance policy which complies with the Safety 
Responsibility Act. Subsection (b) allows "any other method 
approved by the department as affording security ~guivalent 
to that offered by a policy of insurance." (Emphasis added). 
The term "equivalent" is not defined in the statute. 
It may either mean "identical"; or "substantially equal in 
force, amount or value". (See Websters New Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1977). Whichever meaning is assioned, the 
trial court's decision requires reversal. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IF "EQUIVALENT" MEANS "IDENTICAL" THEN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS LIABLE FOR NO MORE 
THAN $15,000. 
The respondent states in his brief that "the Utah Auto-
mobile No-Fault Insurance Act incorporates by reference 
the liability provisions of the Utah Safety Responsibility 
Act and makes the liability provisions applicable to Salt 
Lake County." (Respondents' Brief at 10). 
This statement apparently rests on the assumption that 
the "equivalent" security that must be provided by a self-
insurer is identical to the security provided in a policy 
of insurance meeting the Safety Responsibility Act require-
ments. If this interpretation of the word "equivalent" is 
adopted, then the respondents must accept all of the liability 
provisions of that Act, not just those they find favorable. 
The provision of the Act which extends insurance cov-
erage to permissive users is Utah Code Ann. S41-12-21(b): 
Such owner's policy of liability insurance: 
(2) shall insure the person named 
therein and any other person, as insured, 
using any such motor vehicle or vehicles with 
the express or implied permission of s~ch .. 
named insured, against loss from the 11ab1l1ty 
imposed by law for damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of such motor 
vehicle or motor vehicles within the United 
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States of America or the Dominion of Canada 
subject to limits exclusive of interest and' 
costs, with respect to each such motor 
vehicle in~amount specified in section 
41-12-l(k) of this act. (EmphasTSadde(f): 
The amount specified in §41-12-l(k) (Supp., 1979) for 
bodily injury to or death of one person, in any one acci-
dent is $15,000. 
If, as respondents claim, the Safety Responsibility 
Act is binding on Salt Lake County, then the $15,000 limit 
imposed is also binding. 
POINT II 
IF "EQUIVALENT" MEANS "OF SUBSTANTIALLY 
EQUAL VALUE" THEN SALT LAKE COUNTY'S LIA-
BILITY IS LIMITED TO PAYMENT OF NO-FAULT 
BENEFITS ONLY. 
Utah Code Ann. S31-41-5(b) provides that security may 
be provided by any method "~E_Eroved by the department [of 
insurance] as affording security equivalent to that offered 
by a policy of insurance. " (Emphasis added). 
This provision gives the Insurance Department the 
discretion to determine whether any specific arrangement is 
of sufficiently equal value to be approved as affording the 
requisite security. The Insurance Commissioner was obvious~ 
aware of the following factors which contribute to Salt Lake 
County's overall security protecting the public: 
(1) Salt Lake County has authority to levy an 
annual tax to pay valid judgments rendered against it. 
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( 2) Utah Code Ann. §63-48-1, et seq. ( 1953 as 
amended), provides for indemnification of public officers and 
employees for acts committed during the performance of their 
duties, within the scope of their employment, .or under color 
of authority so long as the employee is not acting with 
gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
(3) Under the Governmental Immunity act, Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-7 ( 1953 as amended), Salt Lake County would 
be liable for the negliqent operation of motor vehicles by 
employees within the scope of their employment, to the 
extent of $100,000 per injury. 
(4) The Sheriff's Department allows only employees 
to drive its vehicles and with very specific exceptions, 
only within the scope of employment. 
(5) The Utah Automobile No-Fault Act requires a 
self-insurer to pay No-Fault benefits to anyone injured in 
an accident involving the County automobile (whether or not 
the use was permissive). 
Admittedly, this security may not be identical to that 
~ovided by a commercial policy of insurance, but the statute 
does not require it to be. Depending upon the factual situa-
tion existing at the time of the injury, the coverage may be 
greater or lesser than a policy of insurance which complies 
with the Safety Responsibility Act. It is true that there 
is not coverage for permissive users who are not acting within 
-5-
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the scope of employment or under color of authority; but 
on the other hand the limit of liability for use within 
the scope of employment far exceeds the statutory $15,000 
minimum. In many factual settings the liability of the 
self-insured County would be much greater than the pro-
tection required by the No-Fault Act. 
The coverage is of sufficiently equal value that the 
Insurance Commissioner determined that the security was 
"equivalent" and issued a certificate of self-insurance. 
This was well within the discretion that the law allowed 
him, and is not challenged by the plaintiff-respondents. 
The No-Fault Statute provides that a self-insurer will 
"have all of the obligations and rights of an insurer under 
this act." The words "this act", of course, refer to the 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Act, and the obligations referred 
to are the payments of various benefits listed in §31-41-6.* 
Under the Indemnification Statute no limit of liability 
appears to exist. The Governmental Immunity Act limits 
recovery to $100, 000 for bodily injury or death. It is fair 
to assume that plaintiffs would have attempted to bring 
* These benefits include $2,000 medical payments, up to $150 
per week disability payments for a maximum of 52 weeks, S12 
per day loss of service allowance, funeral benefit of $1,000, 
and survivor benefit of $2,000. 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
themselves within the more generous provions of one or both 
of these Acts had the facts permitted it. Instead of pur-
suing these remedies, however, plaintiff chose to pursue 
the County as a "self-insurer" under the No-Fault Act. The 
County has fully met its obligations thereunder by paying 
the required No-Fault benefits to the respondents. 
Respondents state in their brief that if "Salt Lake 
County did not provide liability automobile coverage, then 
the No-Fault Act says that it has no immunity for liability 
and would be liable for the judgment in any event." (Brief 
of Respondent at p. 11). 
This is an apparent reference to §31-41-9(2). But when 
the entire section is considered in context, it is clear 
that respondents' position is a total misconstruction of 
the statute. The section provides: 
(1) No person for whom direct benefit 
coverage is provided for in this act shall be 
allowed to maintain a cause of action for general 
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged 
to have been caused by an automobile accident ex-
cept where there has been caused by this accident 
any one or more of the following: 
(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment or fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) Medical expenses to a person in 
excess of $500. 
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(2) The owner of a motor vehicle with re-
spect to which security is required by this act 
who fails to have such security in effect at the 
time o~ a~ ~ccident shall have ~o immunity from 
tort 11ab1l1ty and shall be personally liable for 
the payment of the benefits provided for under 
Section 31-41-6. (Emphasis added). 
The section provides for immunity from tort liability 
unless the accident is so serious as to meet one of the five 
No-Fault threshold standards. Subsection (2) merely states 
that one who fails to maintain the required security may be 
sued for an accident where there is no death, fracture, dis-
ability, disfiqurement, or $500 in medical expenses. In 
addition the person must personally pay the No-Fault bene-
fits (which are listed in §31-41-6). This section has no 
applicability to the facts of this case. 
POINT I I I 
RESPONDENTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO RECOVER ON 
AN IMAGINARY INSURANCE POLICY. 
In Point IV of their brief, respondents argue at length 
the facts which establish that Kelly was a permissive user 
of the vehicle. They then conclude that "David Mac Kelly 
was covered under the policy if he was a permissive user" 
(Respondents' Brief at p. 20). Never do the respondents 
refer to any authority, nor state where the idea comes froo 
that permissive users are covered by this so-cal led "policy". 
The respondents state that the limit of liability was 
"at least equivalent to that provided Salt Lake County by 
-8-
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Gulf" (Respondents' Brief at p. 11).* Never do the respon-
dents explain why the Gulf Insurance Company policy, which 
was not renewed by the County and was not in effect when 
the accident occurred, has any relevance whatever. Nor do 
respondents explain why the last policy, and not some other 
previous policy, contains the applicable terms for self 
insurance. This assert ion has no bas is in the statutes. 
There is no authority cited to support it, and no logical 
argument is made to explain it. 
Insurance contracts include numerous terms: the per-
sons insured, the risks insured, the duties of the insurer 
and the insured, the limits of liability, and so forth. 
Because these elements must be defined precisely, the law 
requires insurance policies to be in writing. Utah Code 
Ann. §31-19-18 (1953 as amended). 
Respondents would have this Court adopt a position 
that would require a trial court to improvise all of these 
policy provisions after an accident has occurred. Such is 
untenable. 
The difficulties presented are brought into focus by 
comparing the Safety Responsibility Act with the provisions 
of the Gulf policy. The Safety Responsibility Act requires 
insurance against the risks of "ownership, maintenance or 
*Even if the Gulf policy with its $100,000 limit were some-
how controlling, this does not justify the $150,000 judgment. 
-9-
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use" of the motor vehicle. Utah Code Ann. ~41-12-21(2). 
The previous Gulf policy (and most standard form policies) 
provide additional coverage for the "loading and unloading" 
of the vehicle. The Gulf policy also provided coverage for 
elected or appointed officials while driving non-owned 
automobiles on County business. This provision was obvi-
ously tailored for a governmental entity policy and is not 
found in standard policies or in the Safety Responsibility 
Act. If a loss arises out of one of these risks, a court 
could only speculate as to whether it is covered. 
Most standard policies also contain exclusions. For 
example, the Gulf policy excluded coverage for property 
damage if the property was in the "care, custody or control" 
of the County. No such exclusion is found in the Safety 
Responsibility Act. If a loss arises out of such a situa-
tion, it is impossible, under plaintiffs' theory, to know 
whether there is coverage. 
Courts should not become involved in constructing imagi· 
nary policies after-the-fact. Rather, the obligations of 
self-insurers must be limited to those imposed by statute 
or undertaken in writing. In this case Salt Lake County's 
h ·t ·a equired obligations as a self-insurer were met w en l pa1 r 
No-Fault benefits. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Utah Automobile No-Fault act requires governmental 
entities to provide security "equivalent" to that provided 
by a policy of insurance conforming to the Safety Responsi-
bility Act. The Safety Responsibility Act requires that 
policies insure permissive users of owned vehicles in the 
amount of $15,000. 
If this provision requires Salt Lake County to extend 
coverage to permissive users, it does so only to this limited 
amount. 
If the Safety Responsibility Act is not the basis for 
extending coverage to permissive users, then there is no 
basis. The Legislature has adopted several statutes which 
allow recovery against the County or its employees (such as 
the Governmental Immunity Act and the Employee Indemnifica-
tion Act). These provide protection for the public "of sub-
stantially equal value" to a commercial policy of insurance, 
but do not extend coverage to permissiver users of county 
vehicles who are not within the scope of employment. 
Plaintiffs take the position that courts should con-
struct policies after the fact by taking some (but not all) 
of the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act and some 
(but not all) of the provisions of policies which are no 
lonqer in effect, and then allow recovery on these imagi-
nary policies. 
-11-
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There is no statute, authority, or logical argument 
which can support the trial court's judgment of $150,000. 
It should be set aside and the case dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this ft~ ..... ~ 7 day of ~aR1:1aFy, 1980. 
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Salt Lake County 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Apellants, to Carmen K. Kipp of Kipp and Ch~istian, attorneys 
for respondents, 600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, postage prepaid, this ~:J-'-~- day of February, 
1980. 
Scott Daniels 
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